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COMMENT
JUST SAYING NO:
AVOIDING PREDISPUTE
AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE IN
SECURITIES CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
When a would-be investor attempts to gain access to the securities markets,
she will usually be required to sign an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising
out of the brokerage contract.' These predispute agreements to arbitrate are in
2
If such contracts are valid, an investor will be
an of themselves contracts.
3
forced to forego litigation in favor of arbitration. On May 15, 1989, in the case
4
of Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the United States

Supreme Court held that predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the
Securities Act of 19335 (hereinafter referred to as the "1933 Act") are valid and

enforceable. 6 When coupled with the Court's earlier decision in ShearsonlAmeri7

can Express, Inc. v. McMahon,

which held that predispute agreements to

arbitrate under the Securities Exchange Act of 19348 (hereinafter referred to as
9
the "1934 Act") were valid and enforceable, it appears that all predispute
agreements to arbitrate under the securities laws are presumptively valid and must
be enforced according to their terms. Consequently, the number of securities cases
10

that go to arbitration will likely increase. Brokerage houses favor arbitration.
The above decisions make arbitration more generally available. Thus, one can
expect brokerage houses to implement and enforce predispute agreements to
arbitrate.
Each year the number of security cases that are submitted to arbitration

increases.11 After the McMahon decision, the number of securities claims
arbitrated increased as the Court upheld predispute agreements to arbitrate under
the 1934 Act. 12 In response to the Supreme Court's decision in de Quijas,

1. Heinemann, ArbitrabilityOf ClainsArising Under The Securities ExchangeAct Of1934, 1986
DuKE L.J. 548, 549.
2.. T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURinrEs REGULATION § 14.4, at 533 (st ed. 1985) (Supp. 1988).
See also H.R. REP. No. 96, 68ih Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924) ("Arbitration agreements are simply
matters of contract..."); Fletcher, infra note 10 at 101.
3. See infra notes 4 and 7.
4. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-77(aa) (1982) [hereinafter the Securities Act].
6. De Quijas, 109 S.Ct. at 1919-1922.
7. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-78(kk) (1982).
9. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 236.
10. Fletcher, LearningTo Live With The FederalArbitrationAct -Securities Litigation in A PostMcMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99, 122 (1988).
11. Katsoris, The Arbitration ofa Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDiiAa L. REV. 279, 280 n.7
(1984).
12. Shell, Arbitration and CorporateGovernance, 67 N.C.L. REV. 517 (1989).
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upholding predispute agreements to arbitrate under the 1933 Act, brokerage houses
are likely to repeat the McMahon pattern and move
to arbitrate securities disputes
13
arising under the 1933 Act at an increased rate.
This Comment will explore the current state of securities arbitration and will
examine the advisability of arbitration in a securities context. In addition, this
Comment will consider avenues of relief open to the securities plaintiff who is
seeking to avoid arbitration.
II.

THE FEDERAL POLICY OF ARBITRATION AND ARBITRABILITY

A. Arbitration
Alternative dispute resolution (hereinafter referred to as "ADR") has grown
rapidly in popularity as both lawyers and litigants seek alternatives to litigation.l' The judicial system currently incorporates ADR through the use of out
of court settlements. This use of out-of-court settlements disposes of 90% of all
cases without adjudication. 15 Unfortunately, 85% of attorneys express dissatisfaction with this informal process. 16 The most commonly cited reasons for
17
dissatisfaction include delay in reaching settlement, expense and stress.
In contrast to litigation and the use of out-of-court settlements, ADR
generally, and arbitration specifically, is quick and cost effective. 18 Arbitration
usually takes from four to six months and costs about one third as much as
litigation from start to finish. 19 Consequently, arbitration is an appealing method
of resolving disputes, in that it reduces the time, expense and stress associated
with litigation.2" In addition, as arbitration removes cases from the court system,
court dockets become less crowded.
Historically, Congress has favored arbitration as a method of alternative
dispute resolution. 2 1 Giving expression to its preference in 1925, Congress
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter referred to as the "FAA"). 2

13. Id.
14. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARv. L. REV. 668
(1986).
15. Id. at 670 n.8.
16. Id. at 670.
17. Id.
18. See supra note 11, at 282-283.
19. Fletcher,PrivatizingSecuritiesDisputes Through The Enforcement ofArbitrationAgreements,
71 MINN. L. REv. 393, 458 (1987).
20. Note, The Arbitrability of FederalSecurities Claims: Wilko's Swan Song, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 203, 224 (1987).
21. Note, FederalAnd State SecuritiesClaims: LitigationOrArbitration?,61 WAsH. L. REV. 245,
247 (1986) (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924)).
22. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
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B. The FederalArbitrationAct
The FAA was enacted in 1925 in res onse to pressure by the business
community for an alternative to litigation.2 The Act was intended to reduce
historic judicial hostility toward arbitration. 24 Congress felt that the FAA would
help reduce the costs associated with litigation and would help clear congested
court dockets. 25 The broad language of the FAA thus embodies a strong federal
policy in6 favor of arbitration (hereinafter referred to as the "mandate of the
2

FAA").

The FAA carries out its mandate by making all agreements to arbitrate, "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." 27 By its terms, the FAA applies only to
transactions in interstate commerce. 28 However, interstate commerce has been
defined so broadly that almost all securities transactions will fall within the
one that must be
definition. 29 The FAA creates a presumption of arbitrability,
30
overcome by a party seeking to avoid arbitration.
The presumption of arbitrability is particularly important where the presumption is not rebutted and the arbitrator renders a decision. This is so, because the
grounds for judicial review of the arbitrator's decision are extremely limited.3 1
Under the FAA there are only four grounds for overturning an arbitrator's
decision:
(1) There was an undisclosed relationship between an arbitrator and a
party or his counsel affecting the arbitrator's impartiality or appearance
of impartiality;
(2) The arbitrator was corrupt;
(3) The arbitrator failed to schedule or conduct the hearing in a fair and
judicious manner;
which he was not authorized to grant
(4) The arbitrator granted relief
32
under the arbitration contract.
Unless one of these four grounds is shown to exist, the arbitrator's decision will
stand. Therefore, failure to rebut the presumption renders one subject to an
arbitration proceeding from which the right to appeal is limited to a narrow

23. Note, The Preclusive Effect Of Arbitral Determinations In Subsequent Federal Securities
Litigation, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 655, 659 (1987).
24. Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974).
25. Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (D. D.C. 1972).
26. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
28. Id.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 1. See also Fletcher, supra note 19, at 402 (1982).
30. See supra note 10, at 109.
31. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
32. See supra note 11, at 290-91. See also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
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spectrum. Absent misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, her decision will be
final. This should not be a cause for concern if the arbitration process,3 3including
the initial agreement to arbitrate, is fundamentally fair to all parties.
C. The Mandate of the FAA
The language of the FAA is broad and its mandate, as interpreted by the
courts, is no less expansive. 34 In a line of cases running from 1967 to 1987 the
United States Supreme Court has given an expansive interpretation to the FAA.
35
(1) In the first of these cases, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FAA. 36 The FAA was
challenged on the ground that Congress may not "fashion federal substantive rules
to govern questions arising in simple diversity" under the doctrine of Erie R. Co.
v. Tompkins.3 7 The Court reshaped the inquiry to be, "[W]hether Congress may
prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject
matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate." 38 The Court answers
the question in the affirmative, noting federal authority over interstate commerce
and admiralty. 39 Holding clear federal authority to create a substantive law of
arbitrability, the Court found the Act to contain a presumption of arbitrability.
40
(2) In Moses Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
the Supreme Court broadly construed the FAA, finding a presumption in favor of
arbitration. 4 1 The Court states:

The FAA establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an alleged allegation of waiver, delay or a like
42
defense to arbitrability.
The presumption established in Moses operates to place a party seeking to avoid
arbitration in the position of rebutting an unusually strong presumption, with no
explicit guidance as to how this should be done. The Court's next decision

33. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
35. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
36. Id. at 404-5.
37. Id. at 405 (citing 304 U.S. 64 (1939)).
38. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
39. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924)); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1924).
40. Moses, 460 U.S. at 1.
41. Id. at 24-25.
42. Id.
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interpreting the FAA provides no answers to the Moses problem, but further
expands the reach of the Act.
(3) In the case of Southland Corp. v. Keating, 43 the Supreme Court
expands the reach of the FAA into state courts. 44 The California Supreme Court
held that anti-waiver provisions of that state's Franchise Investment Law
prohibited arbitration. 45 The United States Supreme Court found the California
law to be in conflict with the FAA. 4 6 The Court held that the FAA overrides
state law, where such state law conflicts with the FAA. 47 In so doing, the Court
expands upon its holding in PrimaPaint,that the FAA created substantive federal
law, by relying on the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to
extend the mandate of the FAA.4 °
(4) In 1985, the Court answered the question left open in Moses as to how
one rebuts the presumption of arbitrability. The Court in MitsubishiMotors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,49 established. the principle that "unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies
for the statutory rights at issue," courts must strictly enforce arbitration agreements.50 The analysis under Mitsubishi involves a determination of whether the
agreement to arbitrate was broad enough to encompass consideration of the
statutory claims and then whether Congressional intent exists to preclude
arbitration.5 1 If either criterion is met, the52presumption established in Moses is
overcome and arbitration can be avoided.
(5) In the same.term that Mitsubishi was decided, the Court decided Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd.5 3 Byrd reiterates many of the Court's prior
statements involving the broad mandate of the FAA in promoting arbitration, but
in a context that significantly advances that mandate. The Court reiterates its
holding in Moses that where there is doubt concerning the validity of an arbitration

43. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
44. Id. at 16. See also Note, PunitiveDamages In SecuritiesArbitration:The Unresolved Question
of Pendent State Claims, 37 CAm. U.L. REv. 1113, 1117 (1988).
45. Id. at 4-5.
46. Id. at 17.
47. Id. at 16. See also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 488-490 (1987).
48. Id. at 16. The Supremacy Clause reads: The Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof...shall be the supreme Law of the Land and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
49. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
50. Id. at 628.
51. Id.
52. In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 224-227 (1987) the Court
held that the burden of persuasion is on the party attempting to prove a Congressional exception to the
FAA.
53. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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agreement, that doubt should be resolved in favor of arbitration. 54 The Court
also {presaged}??? the Mitsubishi test, noting that the FAA represents a
be
Congressional policy that favors arbitration and that such policy cannot
55
overridden "absent a countervailing policy in another federal statute."
The Byrd Court expands the scope of the FAA by abolishing the intertwining
doctrine. The intertwining doctrine holds that where non-arbitrable federal claims
are intertwined with arbitrable state claims, a court in its discretion can choose to
litigate all the claims in federal court, despite any agreement to arbitrate. 56 The
court in abolishing the intertwining doctrine specifically notes that considerations
of judicial economy cannot override the mandate of the FAA. Inefficient
"piecemeal" proceedings are required. 57 Those claims subject to valid agreements to arbitrate must go to arbitration, even when to do so would be inefficient.
This line of cases establishes the sweeping breadth of the FAA. It is in light
of this mandate that predispute agreements to arbitrate securities disputes must be
considered. The party seeking to avoid a predispute agreement to arbitrate in their
brokerage contract will have to overcome a presumption of arbitrability, embodied
in substantive federal law, by showing an explicit intent on the part of Congress
to exempt the transaction. The enforceability of predispute agreements to arbitrate
securities disputes has tracked the expansion of the FAA.
. III. SECURITIES ARBITRATION
In a line of cases running from 1953 to 1989 the United States Supreme Court
has ruled on the enforceability of predispute agreements to arbitrate securities
disputes. 58 These rulings have reflected the expansion of the FAA's mandate
favoring arbitration.
A. The Wilko Case and its Erosion
(1) The first significant case in the area of securities arbitration is the
Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan. 59 The case arose out of a predispute
agreement to arbitrate a security claim under section 12(c) 60 of the 1933
Act. 61 The Court held that predispute agreements to arbitrate under the 1933 Act
are unenforceable. 6 2 The Court reasons that three factors combined to create a
special right under section 12(c) of the 1933 Act, thus exempting such claims from

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 221.
Id.
Id. at 216-217.
Id. at 217-221.
See supra note 10, at 99.
346 U.S. 427 (1953).
15 U.S.C. § 711 (1982).
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427.
Id. at 435-436.
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the FAA. First, under section 12(c) of the 1933 Act scienter need not be
proven. 63
Second, plaintiffs are given a choice between federal and state forums. 64
Finally, section 1465 of the 1933 Act prohibits any waiver of compliance with
the Act. 66 In addition, the Wilko Court was motivated inJart by the perceived
inability of arbitration procedures to protect the investor.
Due to the substantial similarity between section 14 of the 1933 Act and
section 29(a) of the 1934 Act, 68 lower courts in the wake of Wilko applied the
Wilko Doctrine to 1934 Act claims as well. 6 9 The net effect of the decision in
Wilko was to make all securities claims non-arbitrable. Under the Wilko Doctrine
all predispute agreements to arbitrate would be unenforceable.
(2) The Supreme Court began to cut back on the Wilko Doctrine in 1974. In
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,70 the Court was faced with a predispute agreement
to arbitrate a securities dispute under section 10b-5 7 1 of the 1934 Act.7 2 While
the decision in Wilko and its progeny should have disposed of the case, it did not,
as the Court found a crucial distinction between Wilko and Sherk. Sherk involved
an international securities transaction which the Court found to be fact determinative. 73 The Court, citing considerations of comity and certainty, 74 held that
predispute agreements to arbitrate securities disputes were valid and enforceable
in an international transaction. 75 Shirk marks the beginning of Wilko's erosion.
(3) The next case in the Court's retreat from Wilko is Dean Witter Reynolds
v. Byrd.76 As noted earlier, Byrd confronted the problem of arbitrable state
77
claims joined with nonarbitrable federal securities claims under the 1934 Act.
For the first time the FAA and the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, as
interpreted by Wilko met head on, and the FAA won. The Court in abolishing the

63. 15 U.S.C. § 711 (1982).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982).
65. Id. at § 77n.
66. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427-433.
67. Id. at 433-435.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982).
69. See supra note 20, at 209 (citing cases). See also note 11, at 297 (citing cases where the Wilko
doctrine was applied to sections 5 and 17 of the 1933 Act).
70. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).

71. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Sherk, 417 U.S. at 508-509.
Id. at 517-518.
Id. at 518-519.
Id. at 519-520.
Supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Sherk, 417 U.S. at 214.
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intertwining doctrine read the FAA to mandate the arbitration
of arbitrable claims,
78
even when joined with nonarbitrable federal claims.
(4) The first of the Supreme Court's landmark securities cases was
Shearson/American Express, Inc., v. McMahon.79 Under the 1933 Act, causes
of action are expressly granted,8 ° while under the 1934 Act they are implied8 1.
As noted above, lower courts had applied Wilko to causes of action under the 1934
Act, holding such predispute agreements to arbitrate are unenforceable. 82 In
McMahon, the Court distinguishes between the treatment of express claims under
the 1933 Act and the implied claims arising under the 1934 Act. The Court
addresses the question of the validity of predispute agreements to arbitrate
implied
83
causes of action under the 1934 Act, finding such claims arbitrable.
The McMahon decision overturned the Wilko progeny which applied the Wilko
Doctrine to 1934 Act cases. After McMahon, predispute agreements to arbitrate
under the 1934 Act are enforceable. 84 The decision also laid the groundwork for
the eventual complete overruling of Wilko. The McMahon Court notes that the
inability of arbitration to protect the investor was central to the decision in Wilko.
The Court further notes that arbitration has progressed since the time of Wilko in
1953. The Court found current arbitration procedures adequate to protect the
investor. 85 While holding 1934 Act claims arbitrable, the Court declined to
overrule Wilko, as the arbitrability of 1933 Act claims was not before the Court.
(5) In Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,86 the
Court addressed the question of the arbitrability of claims under section 12(2) the
1933 Act. 87 In this second landmark case, the Court overturned Wilko. 8° The
Court held that predispute agreements to arbitrate under the 1933 Act were
enforceable. 89 The Court notes the line of cases establishing the mandate of the
FAA and applies the Mitsubishi test to the 1933 Act,9 finding the Wilko
Doctrine wanting. The Court further notes the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate
why arbitration was an inappropriate forum for the resolution of 1933 Act claims
or to demonstrate how the predispute agreement to arbitrate in question was

78. Id. at 221.
79. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-77(aa) (1982).
- 82. Supra note 66 and accompanying text.
83. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 236.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 230-232.
86. 109 S.Ct. 1917 (1989).
87. Id. at 1919. Section 12(2) provides civil liability for anyone who offers or sells a security in
violation of the Section 5 timing rules.
88. De Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1919.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1920-1921.
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adhesive. 9 1 It would seem that after McMahon and De Quijas all predispute
agreements to arbitrate securities claims, whether under the 1933 or 1934 Act, are
enforceable.
B. The Post De Quijas Cases
Immediately after the United States Supreme Court's decision in De Quijas,
lower courts interpreted the holding as both compelling enforcement of predispute
agreements to arbitrate in securities cases and as expanding the mandate of the
FAA. Two cases are illustrative.
92

(1) Brown v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.

The plaintiff in Brown asserted claims under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. He
attempted to avoid arbitration on several grounds. He argued that the Supreme
Court's decisions in McMahon and De Quijas should not be applied retroactively
to a brokerage contract entered into before the decisions were handed down; that
there was a waiver of the predispute agreement to arbitrate; and that a lack of
meaningful discovery prevented him from challenging the arbitration agreement. 9 3 The Eleventh Circuit denied each of the laintiff's
arguments and held
4
the predispute agreement to arbitrate enforceable.
It is interesting to note that the Brown court gives retroactive effect to the
decisions in McMahon and De Quijas. More interesting, however, is that a lack
of discovery is no bar to enforcement. By excluding meaningful discovery in an
arbitration context the court has placed a thumb on the scales of justice. If, as the
court notes, "The party opposing arbitration bears the initial responsibility of
informing the court of its opposition [to the predispute agreement to arbitrate]," 95 and yet cannot conduct discovery, how is the burden of rebutting the
presumption of validity of the predispute agreement to arbitrate to be met? The
answer appears to be, not easily. Court sanctioned lack of discovery prevents the
party opposing arbitration from gaining the information the same court demands
to rebut the presumption of arbitrability. Fundamental fairness would seem to
suggest that the party opposing arbitration be given the opportunity to discover the
information necessary to overcome the presumption. That arbitration is compelled
in such a situation is telling. The federal policy favoring arbitration must be broad
indeed.
96
(2) Securities Indust. Assoc. v. Connolly

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1921.
No. 13404 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 1989) (LEXIS Genfed library, Cir. file).
Id.
Id.
Id.
No. 13081 (1st Cir. Aug. 31, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. file).
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At issue in Connolly was a Massachusetts statute that regulates predispute
agreements to arbitrate. The statute requires that brokerage firms (1) not require,
"individuals to enter PDAAs as a nonnegotiable condition precedent to account
relationship," (2) "order the prohibition brought conspicuously to the attention of
the prospective customers," and (3) provide "written disclosure of the 'legal effect
of the pre-dispute arbitration contract'." The statute was held to be invalid under
the preemption doctrine as it conflicted with the FAA.97
Under the preemption doctrine the state regulation is preempted by the FAA
if the two statutes are in conflict. 98 The Connolly interpreted De Quijas as
indicating that Congress' intent to mandate the enforceability of arbitration
agreements must be fully protected. 99 The court reasoned that the FAA forbids
1°°
States from regulating arbitration any more strictly than an ordinary contract.
The decision in Connolly is striking. That the FAA represents a substantive
body of federal law on arbitration is beyond dispute. 1 1 That the federal law of
arbitration established in the FAA overrides contrary state law under a preemption
analysis is established. 10 2 That the FAA prohibits states from regulating
predispute agreements to arbitrate is novel.
The FAA attempts to place predispute agreements to arbitrate on an equal
footing with other contracts; 10 3 it does not prohibit states from regulating such
contracts. 10 4 The Massachusetts statute does not prohibit the use of arbitration. 10 5 It merely requires safeguards to ensure investor protection. 10 6 The
statute prevented contracts of adhesion and requires informed consent on the part
of the investor. 10 7 The Connolly court's decision seems to pave the way for
brokers to utilize contracts of adhesion, whereby investors will unknowingly waive
the right to access a judicial forum. Further, it prohibits states from regulating to
prevent such conduct. In light of Connolly, states may not regulate where such
regulation would involve any potential conflict with the FAA.
IV.

APPROACHES TO SECURITIES ARBITRATION

The historical development of the FAA mandate (enforcing agreements to
arbitrate) and the parallel development of the enforceability of predispute
agreements to arbitrate in securities cases, leave the party seeking to avoid
arbitration in a difficult and perhaps insupportable position. McMahon and De

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 2 and 95.
104. See supra note 22.
105. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 950, §§ 12.204 (G) (1) (a)-(c) (1978).
106. See supra note 95.
107. Id.
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SECURITIES ARBITRATION

Quijas seem to indicate that all predispute agreements to arbitrate in brokerage
contracts are enforceable. 10 8 However, a careful analysis of De Quijas and the
FAA leaves some room for hope that predispute agreements to arbitrate may yet
be avoided in securities cases. Four approaches seem to be available for the party
seeking to avoid arbitration:
(1) Challenging the Appropriateness of Arbitration;
(2) Arguing that Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate are Contracts of
Adhesion;
(3) Asserting Undecided Statutory Claims;
(4) Asserting Traditional Contract Defenses.
A. The Appropriateness of Arbitration
If arbitration is fundamentally fair to all parties, redispute agreements to
arbitrate should be enforced according to their terms. 109 Unfortunately, this may
not be the case. The Court in McMahon felt that arbitration had progressed since
the Wilko decision in 1953.110 However, the dissent questions the adequacy of
arbitration, as the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as
that the SEC lacks the ability to
SEC) does not have sufficient oversight, noting
11
specifically review arbitration proceedings.
The arbitration system used in the securities industry is the product of industry
and SEC cooperation. 112 The parties to a securities arbitration agreement may
choose either to arbitrate under the auspices of one of the self regulatory
organizations (hereinafter referred to as SROs), such as the New York Stock
Exchange, or the American Arbitration Association (hereinafter referred to as
AAA). 113 The SEC has no oversight over the AAA, but does possess oversight
over the SROs. 114 The SEC seeks, through its oversight, to strengthen the
over the SROs
legitimacy of securities arbitration. 1 15 However, this oversight
16
does not include the ability to overturn an arbitration award.'

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See supra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 230-232.
Id. at 240-242.
Id. at 262.
See supra note 14, at 681.
Note, PunitiveDamagesIn SecuritiesArbitration:The Unresolved Question ofPendentState

Claims, 37 CATH. U.L.REv. 1113, 1129 (1988).

114. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 230-232.
115. See generally Fletcher, supra note 10, at 136. (SEC seeks to increase its oversight capabilities
as some courts preface their decisions on the adequacy of arbitral procedures).
116. Supra note 112, at 1129. The four factors are:
(1) There was an undisclosed relationship between an arbitrator and a party or
his counsel affecting the arbitrator's impartiality;
(2) The arbitrator was corrupt;
(3) The arbitrator failed to schedule or conduct the hearing in a fair and
judicious manner; and
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This inability to review arbitral decisions becomes critical when one realizes
that the courts are almost equally unable to review an arbitral decision. The FAA
lists four grounds upon which an arbitrator's decision can be overturned. 117 In
addition, the Supreme Court has allowed an arbitration award to be overturned for
manifest disregard of the law. 118 Absent egregious behavior by the arbitrator,
the arbitration award will be unassailable.
It is argued that to allow greater review of arbitration awards would be to lose
the benefits of arbitration as an unsuccessful party would immediately appeal. 119 This is not the case. Allowing more liberal review of arbitration does
decision, if appealed,
not destroy the efficacy of the arbitration process as the120
would be admissible as evidence in the later proceeding.
With no meaningful review of the arbitration award available, the investor
must accept the rough justice of arbitration. Discovery rules do not apply in
arbitration, 12 1 though arbitrators do have subpoena powers. 12 2 Arbitrators are
not bound by the rules of evidence. 123 Arbitrators are not bound by' principles
of substantive law. 124 Arbitrators are not bound by stare decisis. 12- Arbitrators need not state their reasons for an award, nor are they required to make
truncated procedure is
written findings of fact. 126 The rationale given for this
127
that arbitration is intended to be quick and efficient.
"But surely the mere resolution of a dispute is not proof that the public
interest has been served." 128 The Securities Acts are intended to provide
protection to purchasers of registered securities 129 and to promote investor
confidence. 130 Congress, in enacting the Securities Acts, established a policy
of protecting investors through specific statutory mechanisms. Yet arbitrators are

(4) The arbitrator granted relief which he was not authorized to grant under the
arbitration clause.
117. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
118. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-437.
119. Bruff, Public Programs,Private Deciders: The Constitutionalityof Arbitration in Federal
Programs,67 TEX. L. REV. 441, 477 (1989); See also Katsoris, supra note 11, at 291 n.84.
120. See supra note 23, at 687.
121. Foremost Yam Mills, Inc. v. Rose Mills, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
122. Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980).
123. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203 n.4 (1956);
National Post Office Mailhandlers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 751 F.2d 834, 841 (6th Cir.
1985).
124. University of Alaska v. Modem Constr., Inc., 522 P.2d 1132, 1140 (Alaska 1974).
125. M. HILL & A. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE INARBITRATION 1, 40-41 (1980).
126. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
127. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972).
128. Supra note 14, at 676-678.
129. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983).
130. Supra note 19, at 460 (citing King v. Sussex Justices, 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1924)).
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not competent to deal with statutory claims. 131 An arbitrator's authority is
purely contractual. 13 2 Public policy concerns are beyond the pale of an arbitrator's purview. 133
Equally, much arbitration is conducted by the SROs.13 4 To allow "those
the law seeks
to regulate to delimit public rights and duties... [is] real reason for
13 5
concern."
Where the legislature has established strict standards, allowing arbitration to lessen
those standards runs counter to the rule of law. 13 6 It would seem fundamentally unfair to allow organizations made up of brokers to decide complaints made
against brokers.
As "[t]he primary purpose of the securities laws is to protect investors who
are not able to protect themselves," 137 it might be argued that the time has
come for an unsophisticated investor exception to the De Quijas Doctrine. Namely,
that the federal policy of protectin investors embodied in the 1933 and 1934 Acts
is a countervailing federal policy N 8 which should override the FAA where one
of the parties to an agreement to arbitrate is an unsophisticated investor; the very
type of investor the Securities Acts were designed to protect. The FAA should not
be construed to demand arbitration where one of the parties is unsophisticated, as
to do so allows a private decision-maker to delimit federal rights. De Quijas, if
applied broadly, will undermine Congress' intent to protect the unsophisticated
investor, as embodied in the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The right to a federal forum
under the Securities Acts is rendered nugatory by allowing mandatory arbitra1 39
tion.
The argument is made, however, that predispute agreements to arbitrate are
merely forum selection devices. 140 Here again, this is not the case. An
arbitration clause is not a mere forum selection device. "To the degree that
arbitration alters the combination of remedies and sanctions afforded by state law,
it modifies substantive law in ways unintended by the drafters of the Federal
Arbitration Act and interferes with the contractual expectations of parties to an
141
arbitration agreement."'

131. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981); Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974); McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984)
("[A]lithough arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual disputes... it cannot provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting federal statutory and constitutional rights....
132. Barrentine,450 U.S. at 744; Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53-54.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 112.
135. See Edwards, supra note 14, at 676.
136. Id. at 677.
137. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 427.
138. Id. at 428.
139. Heinemann, supra note 1, at 552.
140. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 410-11.
141. Note, supra note 112, at 1114-1115.
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Punitive damages provide a ready example. Punitive damages are unavailable
under securities arbitration. 142 "[T]o the extent that arbitral considerations
excludes punitive awards, the process sacrifices both systemic efficiency and
investor protection," 143 and weakens "deterrence of already outrageous conduct
on Wall Street by reducing or eliminating potential exposure to punitive
liability."'144 "[A] denial of punitive damage awards arguably interferes with
arbitrations function of providing a substantially equivalent forum for dispute
resolution." 14 5 At best if arbitration is merely a forum selection device, it is an
inappropriate and ineffective one, as the efficacy of arbitration to resolve questions
of federal rights
is suspect due to the inherent procedural limitations of the arbitral
14 6
process.
The De Quijas Court citing Wilko notes; "There is nothing in the record
before us, nor in the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the
arbitral system . ..would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is
entitled." 147 Thus, the burden falls on the plaintiff seeking to avoid arbitration
to show why arbitration should not be compelled. By demonstrating the
inappropriateness of arbitration to deal with federal rights under the Securities
compel arbitration
Acts, a plaintiff might avoid arbitration. The courts should not
148
of securities disputes until arbitration has been improved.
B. PredisputeAgreements to Arbitrate are Contracts of Adhesion
An adhesion contract arises when a party must accept or reject a contract
without an opportunity to negotiate the terms. 149 If such a contract of adhesion
runs counter to a parties expectations or is oppressive, unconscionable or against
public policy it will be unenforceable. 150 If an adhesion contract removes all
choice, in that a party has no alternative but to sign the contract, the contract
should be per se unenforceable as against public policy.
It is often said that to gain access to the securities markets an investor will
have to sign an agreement to arbitrate. 15 1 If this is strictly accurate, an
argument could be made that the predispute agreements to arbitrate are adhesive
in nature and ought not to be enforced on that ground, as they are oppressive,
unconscionable and against public policy. 152 In an attempt to ascertain the truth

142. Id. at 1120. Punitive damages are unavailable for federal claims but are available for
violations of state securities laws.
143. Id. at 1114.
144. Id. at 1127.
145. Id.
146. Note, supra note 23, at 666-67.
147. De Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
148. Note, supra note 21, at 261.
149. Katsoris, supra note 11, at 306.
150. Id. at 307.
151. Id. at 292; See also supra note 21, at 245.
152. See supra note 21, at 259 n.107 (citing a case finding no adhesion).
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or falsity of such claims, this author in preparing this Comment conducted a
survey of leading brokerage houses to determine to what extent access to the
securities markets is predicated on signing a predispute agreement to arbitrate.
The results of this telephone survey indicate that 100% of brokerage houses
require a customer to sign a predispute agreement to arbitrate where the customer
is opening a margin account. The universal reason given for this requirement is
that, as margin accounts involve an extension of credit by the brokerage house to
the customer, the brokerage houses desire an expeditious forum for resolving
disputes where their capital is being used. In cash accounts the situation is in flux.
Currently, approximately 50% of the brokerage houses surveyed require that
a customer sign a predispute agreement to arbitrate when opening a cash account.
While cash accounts involve no extension of credit to the customer by the
brokerage house, the trend is towards including predispute agreements to arbitrate
in cash accounts. Many of the brokers surveyed, indicated that the industry was
153
moving toward requiring predispute agreements to arbitrate in cash accounts.
In those brokerage houses that require predispute agreements to arbitrate in cash
accounts, 154 several such requirements had been instituted within the last year.
The results of the survey are as follows:
BROKERAGE HOUSES REQUIRING
PREDISPUTE AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
MARGIN
CASH
FIRM
No
Yes
A.G. Edwards
Yes
Yes
Charles Schwab
No
Witter,
Reynolds
Yes
Dean,
Yes
Yes
Edward D. Jones
Yes
Yes
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
Yes
Yes
Kidder, Peabody & Co.
No
Merrill Lynch
Yes
No
Paine Webber
Yes
Yes
Yes
Shearson, Lehman, Hutton
No
Yes
Smith Barney
The possibility that predispute agreements to arbitrate are adhesive in nature
when looking at the securities industry as a whole or are adhesive in any single
case raises, beyond the contract argument, serious questions of a constitutional
nature. The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the
right to a jury trial. 155 Arbitration does away with udicial niceties in favor of
a more efficient method of dispute resolution, 1 including a jury. 157 The

153. These brokers include: Charles Schwab; Shearson Lehman, Hutton; A.G. Edwards; Dean,
Whitter, Reynolds; and Edward D. Jones.
154. These brokers include: Kidder, Peabody & Co. and Shearson, Lehman, Hutton.
155. U.S. CONST. art VII.
156. See supra text this Comment, at § IV(A): The Appropriateness of Arbitration.
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right to a jury trial can be waived, but such waiver must be voluntary and

knowing. 158

In order for arbitration to be binding and not run afoul of the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, the predispute agreement to arbitrate must be
entered into voluntarily and knowingly. The investor can waive his right, but there
needs to be choice and knowledge of the significance of the act to make the
waiver meaningful. 159 If the contract is classically one of adhesion, there is by
definition no choice and thus an argument that the predispute agreement to
arbitrate is violative of the Seventh Amendment and ought not be enforced.
In light of the author's research, it would seem that there is a strong argument
that predispute agreements to arbitrate in brokerage contracts are adhesive. 100%
of all margin accounts and 50% of all cash accounts require such agreements, if
one is to gain access to the securities markets. Thus in 75% of all cases, if a
customer wishes to purchase or sell securities, she will have to sign a predispute
agreement to arbitrate or be barred from entering the market through a brokerage
house.
In De Quijas, the Court notes "[a]lthough petitioners suggest that the
agreement to arbitrate here was adhesive in nature, the record contains no factual
showing sufficient to support that suggestion." 160 The court's statement appears
to leave open the possibility that a successful showing that a predispute agreement
to a different result, namely avoidance of the
to arbitrate was adhesive could lead
16 1
predispute agreement to arbitrate.
C. Asserting Undecided Statutory Claims
The cause of action in De Quijas was a section 12(2) claim under the 1933
Act. 162 As this was the only section before the court, a narrow interpretation
of the decision could limit the holding to section 12(2).163 Section 17164
would technically remain available to a party seeking to avoid arbitration, its
arbitrability undecided by the Court in De Quijas.
Unlike 12(2), 17(a) grants no express private rights, nor does the section grant
a forum choice; further, the plaintiff must prove willfulness. 165 Nevertheless,
some courts have found an implied cause of action under section 17(a), while

157. See generally supra note 113.
158. Edwards, supra note 14, at 674.
159. Supra note 21, at 255.
160. De Quijas, 109 S.Ct. at 1921.
161. See supra note 21, at 259.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982); De Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1919.
163. But see Brown, No. 13404 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 1989) (LEXIS Genfed library, Cir. file); supra
note 92 and accompanying text.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 77(q) (1982).
165. Id.
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others have not. 166 The split in the circuits would seem to make such an issue
ripe for certification by the Supreme Court.
For the party seeking to avoid a predispute agreement to arbitrate, section
17(a) is one avenue of attack. albeit a weak one. One must be in a jurisdiction
allowing the private cause of action and one must overcome the inherent
weaknesses in a 17(a) argument. Because 17(a) does not include the special
protections of section 12(2), it will be harder to satisfy a court that the Mitsubishi
167
test is met (that Congress intended to create an exception to the FAA).
Further, 17(a) does not protect against broker fraud but only protects purchasers
169
sucof securities. 168 In light of the expansive reading given De Quijas,
cess in avoiding a predispute agreement to arbitrate by framing ones complaint as
a 17(a) violation is highly problematic.
D. Asserting Traditional Contract Defenses
The FAA makes all agreements to arbitrate, "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." 17° The last quoted clause would allow a party seeking to
avoid a predispute agreement to arbitrate to plead contract defenses, as predispute
171
agreements to arbitrate are contracts.
Such defenses would include arguments that the predispute agreement to
arbitrate was unconscionable as a contract of adhesion. 172 Additional arguments
might be made that the predispute agreement to arbitrate was fraudulently entered
into, that there was no valid offer and acceptance of the terms of the predispute
agreement to arbitrate, mistake, misunderstanding or that predispute agreement to
arbitrate was an unauthorized modification of the contract not within the
contemplation of the parties. 173 These and other contract arguments have rarely
been argued and are beyond the scope of this Comment, but might have some
viability.

166. For Circuits upholding a private cause of action see, Berger v. Bishop Inv. Corp., 695 F.2d
302, 305 (8th Cir. 1982); Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978); Newman v.
Prior, 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1975); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965),
rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 363 (1966). But see In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Lit.,
823 F.2d 1349, 1353-1357 (9th Cir. 1987); Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389-391
(5th Cir. 1982).
167. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
168. See Fletcher, supra note 10, at 132.
169. See Brown, No. 13404 (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 1989) (LEXIS Genfed library, Cir. file); supra note
92 and accompanying text.
170. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
171. See T. HAZEN, supra note 2, H.R. REP. No. 96.
172. See supra text this Comment, at § IV (B): Predispute Agreements To Arbitrate Are Contracts
of Adhesion.
173. See Zenaida v. Drexal Burnham Lambert, No. 10434 (D. Minn. May 24, 1989) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist. file).
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V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recent decisions in the field of securities arbitration
leave little apparent room for a party opposed to arbitration. Yet, such opposition
may be justified by the inherent inefficiencies of the arbitral process. The party
seeking to oppose arbitration in the wake of the De Quijas decision must be
prepared for an up hill battle. However, careful analysis of the FAA and the De
Quijas decision leave room for hope. One can hope that securities arbitration will
be improved to afford investors the protection Congress sought to afford them in
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Until such time, arbitration of securities disputes should
not be compelled.

JIM PARKS
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